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We document that variations in government purchases generate a rise in consumption, the real and
the product wage, and a fall in the markup. This evidence is robust across alternative empirical methodologies
used to identify innovations in government spending (structural VAR vs. narrative approach). Simultaneously
accounting for these facts is a formidable challenge for a neoclassical model, which relies on the wealth
effect on labor supply as the main channel of transmission of unproductive government spending shocks.
The goal of this paper is to explore further the role of the wealth effects in the transmission of government
spending shocks. To this end, we build an otherwise standard business cycle model with price rigidity,
in which preferences can be consistent with an arbitrarily small wealth effect on labor supply, and
highlight that such effect is linked to the degree of complementarity between consumption and hours.
We show that the model is able to match our empirical evidence on the effects of government spending
shocks remarkably well. This happens when the preferences are such that the positive wealth effect on















The responses of several macroeconomic variables to government spending shocks are
interesting for their obvious policy implications, but also because some of these responses
(notably those of private consumption and of the real wage) are potentially powerful
tools to discriminate between di⁄erent models. Empirically, several authors (see FatÆs
and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gal￿, L￿pez-Salido and VallØs (2007),
Perotti (2007)) have found that government spending shocks cause private consumption
and the real product wage to rise: although these ￿ndings are not unchallenged (see
e.g., Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), and Ramey (2008)), we argue below that they are indeed
common to the two main time series methodologies that have been used in this debate.
We also show evidence that the markup responds negatively to government spending
shocks - a result that, to our knowledge, has not been noted before. We then ask what
implications these three pieces of evidence have for existing models.
As ￿rst pointed out in the seminal contribution of Barro and King (1984), a posi-
tive response of private consumption and the real product wage to a shock to wasteful,
unproductive government spending is a formidable challenge for the neoclassical model.
The key mechanism in that model is the negative wealth e⁄ect of a positive government
spending shock, that increases the net present value of taxes paid by the individuals.
This depresses their consumption and shifts out their labor supply, thereby also causing
a decline in the real product wage along a ￿xed labor demand curve.
Some recent models (like Ravn, Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2006) and Gal￿, L￿pez-
Salido and VallØs (2007)) are instead capable of generating a positive response of private
consumption, via positive responses of the real (consumption) wage and negative responses
of the markup. However, to overcome the negative wealth e⁄ect on private consumption
the former must assume a large decline in the markup, and yet consumption increases very
little; the latter must assume instead an extreme form of market incompleteness, whereby
a large fraction of individuals are immune from the negative wealth e⁄ect because they
1do not have access to any type of asset, and must therefore consume their labor income
each period.
The mechanisms emphasized by these papers are important and likely to be empirically
relevant. But before resorting to forms of market incompleteness or speci￿c assumptions
about the elasticity of demand, the goal of this paper is to explore further the transmis-
sion mechanism of ￿scal policy shocks in the most standard neoclassical model, except for
the presence of price rigidity. We start from the Barro-King observation that the driving
force behind any model with rational, forward-looking consumers is the wealth e⁄ect of
the taxes associated with government spending shocks. Hence, in order to generate a pos-
itive response of private consumption and the real wage one has to overcome the negative
wealth e⁄ect of government spending shocks on consumption: rather counterintuitively,
we show that this can happen if preferences are such that the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply
is small, which from the budget constraint implies that the negative wealth e⁄ect of the
higher taxes on consumption is large. We illustrate all this by assuming the type of pref-
erences introduced in the literature by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988), which
essentially allow for an arbitrarily weak wealth e⁄ect on labor supply. These preferences
have been used by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2008)
to show that anticipated future news (on productivity) can drive the business cycle; the
latter authors also estimate the parameters of this utility function, and argue that the
evidence indicates that indeed the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply is practically zero.
Our paper relates also to previous work by Basu and Kimball (2003) who study the
transmission of government spending (and monetary) shocks in a standard New Keynesian
model. In particular, they show how di⁄erent assumptions about adjustment costs on
capital can alter the sign of the e⁄ect of government spending shocks on output. We
show that adjustment costs on capital have drastic implications also for the e⁄ects of
government spending shocks on private consumption. More fundamentally, in Basu and
Kimball (2003) all the e⁄ects of government spending are still driven by the standard
negative wealth e⁄ect on consumption and leisure, hence they have the opposite sign
than in our model.
2The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the empirical evidence.
Section 3 discusses brie￿ y the intuition of our model. Section 4 sets up the model. Sec-
tion 5 illustrates its working in a simple two-period version with ￿ exible and with ￿xed
prices. Section 6 discusses the full, in￿nite horizon version of the model, with ￿ exible and
with sticky prices. Sections 7 and 8 present two important extensions: habit persistence
and capital accumulation. Section 9 discusses the match between the estimated impulse
responses and the impulse responses from a calibrated version of the model. Section 10
concludes.
2 Empirical evidence on consumption, the real wage,
and the markup
We focus on the joint responses to government spending shocks of private consumption,
private investment, the real wage (both the consumption and the product wage), and
the markup. We start by estimating a reduced form VAR in six variables: government
spending on goods and services, GDP, private consumption, private investment (all in
logs of real, per capita terms), the Barro-Sahasakul1 average marginal tax rate on labor
income, and one of the following three variables in turn: the markup, the real consumption
wage, and the real product wage, all three again in logs. The VAR also includes a constant
and a linear trend. Government spending on goods and services is de￿ned as government
consumption plus defense equipment investment, following international guidelines. The
sample runs from 1947:1 to 2003:4 (the constraint on the end date is the availability of
data for the Barro-Sahasakul tax rate). Appendix A describes the data in more detail.
We identify government spending shocks via two alternative methodologies. The ￿rst
is the "SVAR approach " of Blanchard and Perotti (2002): this is based on the idea that,
due to decision and implementation lags, there is no automatic or discretionary response
of government spending to output and other shocks within a quarter. Thus, government
spending shocks are identi￿ed via a Choleski decomposition in which government spending
1See Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986).
3comes ￿rst (see Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). If one, like us, is interested only in the
response to government spending shocks, this is all is needed.
The second method is based on the "Ramey-Shapiro approach" ("RS approach" there-
after) of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), and Burn-
side, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), in turn a variant of the Romer and Romer (1989)
"event study approach" to the identi￿cation of monetary policy shocks. In essence, the
method starts by de￿ning a dummy variable capturing the main episodes of military
buildups due to foreign policy crises (which can be argued to be exogenous and unfore-
castable), and then it traces the e⁄ects over time of a shock to this dummy variable on
several endogenous variables.
Based on a careful reading of the weekly press, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identify the
exact quarter when the expectations of the Korean,Vietnam and Carter-Reagan military
buildups ￿rst took hold, and de￿ne the "war dummy variable" Dt as taking the value
of 1 on 1950:3, 1965:1, 1980:1; to these dates we (like Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004),
Ramey (2006) and Perotti (2007) before us) add 2003:1 to capture the expectation of the
post September-11 military buildup. We include lags 0 to 6 of the dummy variable Dt in
the reduced form equations for government spending and taxation (the two ￿scal policy
variables) and only lag 0 in the other reduced form equations. Formally, and assuming
for illustrative purposes that the VAR includes only two variables, government spending
and output, we estimate the reduced form VAR
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By including six lags of the war dummy variable in the ￿scal policy equation, we allow
the military episodes to explain a large part of the deviation from normal of the policy
variable for seven periods in each episode; but by including only lag 0 in the output
equation, we assume that, after the impact period, the dynamic response of output to these
military buildups follows the "normal" pattern. This speci￿cation captures the notion
that we learn from these military buildup episodes because they are large, exogenous and
4(arguably) unforecasted, not because the response of the economy is special. In other
words, we estimate the "normal" dynamic response of the economy to these "abnormal"
policy events (see Perotti (2007) for a more extended discussion of this issue).2
We consider two di⁄erent measures of the markup, in the non-￿nancial corporate
business sector and in manufacturing. The former, a "value added markup", is constructed
as the share of labor in value added of the non-￿nancial corporate business sector (net of
indirect taxes, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)); the latter, a "gross output markup",
is constructed as the share of labor in manufacturing national income. One advantage of
value added data is that there is a linear relation between the log of the price markup
and the log of the labor share in value added3 (see Appendix B); this is not the case with
gross output data, where the relation might depend on the share and the relative price of
materials and energy.
We do not have data on the hourly wage in the non-￿nancial corporate business sector,
hence we use hourly compensation in the business sector; for manufacturing, we use the
average hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing. To construct the product
wage, we divide the nominal wage measures by the implicit price de￿ ator of the business
sector4 and by the producer price index of manufacturing, respectively. To construct the
consumption wage, we divide the nominal wage measures by the CPI net of food prices.
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of several variables to a government spending
shock in the SVAR speci￿cation (columns 1 and 2) and to a shock to the war dummy
variable in the RS speci￿cations (columns 3 and 4). In columns 1 and 3 the markup refers
2In contrast to our speci￿cation, Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004) include lags 0 to 6 in all equations of the reduced form VAR. Thus, implicitly these
authors assume that the military buildup episodes explain a large part of the deviation from normal of the
dynamics of all endogenous variables for six quarters after each episode. To make this clearer, suppose
there were only one military buildup episode: then including lags 0 to 6 of the war dummy variable in
all reduced form equations would cause the residuals of all equations to be 0 for seven quarters: in other
words, the episode would explain all the deviation from normal of all variables for seven quarters. The
war dummy variable consists of four episodes, hence the problem is less extreme, but the underlying logic
remains the same.
3Possibly after appropriate corrections for the presence, for instance, of non-Cobb-Douglas production
functions, of overhad labor, of labor adjustment costs, or of market power in the labor market (see e.g.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)).
4We use the gross output de￿ ator from BLS since we do not have the value added de￿ ator.
5to the non-￿nancial corporate business sector, the wage variables to the entire business
sector; in columns 2 and 4, both the markup and the wage refer to the manufacturing
sector.
The responses of government spending, private consumption and private investment
are expressed as changes in the share of GDP relative to the pre-shock path, by multiply-
ing the original log response by the average share of each variable in GDP. The responses
of GDP, of the markup, and of the two wage variables are expressed in percentage point
deviations from the pre-shock path. In the SVAR speci￿cation, the initial shock to gov-
ernment spending is normalized to 1 percentage point of GDP. All responses are displayed
with one standard error bands above and below the point estimate.
Note ￿rst that the patterns of all responses are qualitatively similar in the SVAR and
RS speci￿cations, for virtually all variables, except partially private investment and the
product wage. In particular, the peak response of government spending is similar in the
SVAR and the RS speci￿cations, about 1 percent of GDP. We then highlight ￿ve results
that will be useful in discussing our model.
First, in both speci￿cations and with both manufacturing and non-￿nancial corporate
business sector data, private consumption increases; the peak response is remarkably
similar in the SVAR and RS speci￿cations, about .5 percentage points of GDP, and
occurs at roughly the same horizon. Second, investment falls in the SVAR speci￿cation,
particularly with the non-￿nancial corporate business sector data, while it is basically ￿ at
(after a small initial increase) in the RS speci￿cation. Third, in the SVAR speci￿cation
the markup falls, by about .5 percent in the non-￿nancial corporate business sector, and
by more than double this amount in manufacturing. The countercyclical response of the
markup is slightly more muted in the RS speci￿cation (in fact, the markup rises for the
￿rst three quarters in manufacturing). Fourth, the real product wage also rises, by about
1 percentage point at the peak in the non-￿nancial corporate business sector and again
by much more in manufacturing, where the markup response is also stronger. Fifth, the
real consumption wage rises, by less than 1 percentage point at the peak in both sectors,
although it is not always precisely estimated.
63 Intuition
The standard neoclassical model with in￿nitely-lived forward-looking agents, ￿ exible
prices, complete asset markets, and lump-sum taxation (as in Baxter and King (1993))
has fundamental di¢ culties explaining the positive response of private consumption and
of the real product wage to a government spending shock that we have estimated in our
impulse responses. In that model, when government spending increases, expected taxa-
tion increases by the same present value, and the representative household experiences
a negative wealth shock; as a consequence, she consumes less and works more: the labor
supply curve shifts out along an unchanged labor demand curve. Thus, in a neoclassical
model the positive Hicksian wealth e⁄ect5 of a government spending shock on labor sup-
ply plays the key role, and leads to a rise in hours and output and a decline in private
consumption and in the real wage.6
Despite the importance of the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply in this and virtually all
recent dynamic general equilibrium models with government spending (see e.g., Smets and
Wouters (2007)), surprisingly little macro evidence is available on its strength. Schmitt-
GrohØ and Ur￿be (2008) estimate the parameters of the preferences introduced in the
literature by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu⁄man (1988) and recently popularized by
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), which allow for an arbitrarily small Hicksian wealth e⁄ect
on labor supply, and conclude that it is virtually zero.
Thus, we consider the standard King-Plosser-Rebelo (KPR henceforth) preferences
5For future reference, it is useful to distinguish between a "wealth shock" and a "wealth e⁄ect". The
former is the change in wealth caused by a given shock, the latter is the Hicksian wealth e⁄ect on a given
variable generated by the wealth shock. Thus, a negative wealth shock is a decline in wealth; the positive
Hicksian wealth e⁄ect on labor supply of a given negative wealth shock is the rightward shift in labor
supply caused by the decline in wealth. The Hicksian wealth e⁄ect on labor supply (of any given shock
to an exogenous variable) is the change in hours that would obtain if the household received a lump sum
that would generate the same change in utility caused by the shock, but at unchanged (pre-shock) real
prices.
6If taxation were distortionary (see Ohanian (1997), Cooley and Ohanian (1997), and Ludvigson
(1996)), one could think of speci￿c time paths of taxes inducing a pattern of intra- and inter-temporal
substitution that generates temporary increases in consumption or the real wage; however, because of the
negative wealth shock, the present value of consumption and of the real product wage must fall at some
point.
7commonly used in business cycle analyses, but also the Greenwood-Hercowitz-Hu⁄man
(GHH henceforth) preferences, and show how the latter can modify radically the mode
of operation of ￿scal policy in an otherwise standard neoclassical model. In this section,
we provide an intuitive argument of how a low Hicksian wealth e⁄ect on labor supply can
generate a positive response of private consumption to government spending shocks.
When government spending increases, the consumer faces a negative wealth shock
from the associated higher taxes (in present value terms). As a consequence, the labor
supply curve shifts down in the case of KPR preferences: it stays still in the case of GHH
preferences, which feature no wealth e⁄ect on labor supply. If the real wage decreased,
the consumer would also experience a negative substitution e⁄ect on consumption (note
that in equilibrium there is no wealth e⁄ect from changes in the real wage, because in
our model of monopolistic competition changes in labor income and in pro￿ts cancel out,
given hours). Hence, a necessary condition for private consumption to increase is that the
real wage should increase.
A positive real wage response requires labor demand to shift out. This happens in our
model because of rigidities in price setting by monopolistically competitive ￿rms. When
government spending increases, ￿rms face an outward shift in the demand curve for the
variety they produce; those ￿rms that cannot change their prices meet this extra demand
by increasing production, hence shifting out the derived demand for labor.7
But because of price stickiness, movements in the real interest rate are limited. From
the Euler equation, this also limits changes in the marginal utility of consumption. For
illustrative purposes, consider an extreme case: the marginal utility of consumption is
￿xed in the short run. Assume, initially, that hours and consumption are complements,
in the usual sense that the cross-derivative of the utility function is positive.
When labor demand shifts out and hours increase along the labor supply curve, the
7In what follows, for expositional purposes it is useful to think of changes in the real wage as the result
of shifts in the supply of labor and in the (derived) demand for labor. The expression "labor demand"
has to be understood as the contemporaneous relation between the real wage and hours stemming from
the ￿rst order conditions for pro￿t maximization, holding everything else (including, possibly, current
and future values of some endogenous variables) constant.
8marginal utility of consumption increases; to restore the initial value, consumption too
must increase (the derivative of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to con-
sumption is negative). This induces a new outward shift in the demand facing each ￿rm,
and therefore a new outward shift in the derived demand for labor.
When does the process stop? From the aggregate resource constraint of the economy
we know that, in equilibrium, the di⁄erence between hours (and therefore output) and
private consumption must increase exactly by the change in government spending. Clearly,
the higher the complementarity between hours and consumption, the higher the needed
increase in hours and consumption until the above equilibrium condition is realized.
Below we show, as an implication of the Slutsky equation, that the degree of com-
plementarity between hours and consumption is inversely related to the strength of the
wealth e⁄ect on labor supply: hence complementarity is the highest under GHH prefer-
ences (which feature no wealth e⁄ect on labor supply), and declines as one moves towards
KPR preferences. This result explains why the multiplier e⁄ect on private consumption
is highest under GHH. In fact, under KPR preferences, consumption falls if hours and
consumption are substitutes instead of complements.
The above discussion clari￿es the role of the low wealth e⁄ect on labor supply to
generate an increase in consumption. This argument might be counterintuitive at ￿rst,
because from the budget constraint a low wealth e⁄ect on labor supply implies a large
negative wealth e⁄ect of the higher taxes on consumption. But a low wealth e⁄ect on labor
supply also means a small (or zero, in the case of GHH preferences) downward shift in
labor supply; because of this, when labor demand shifts out the real wage increases more,
inducing a larger substitution e⁄ect from leisure into consumption. Hence the degree
of complementarity and the substitution e⁄ect of a higher wage interact in producing a
multiplier e⁄ect on consumption.
94 The model









under the sequence of budget constraints:




where Bt+1 is a portfolio of real state contingent assets, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount
factor, Ct is consumption of a composite ￿nal good which assembles a continuum of
di⁄erentiated varieties produced by monopolistically competitive ￿rms, Wt is the real
wage (the nominal wage divided by the consumption-based price index Pt; de￿ned below),
Nt is labor hours, Tt is real lump-sum taxes, and ￿t(i) are the real pro￿ts of monopolistic
￿rm i, whose shares are owned by the households.8
Final goods producers are perfectly competitive. They assemble the di⁄erentiated










where " > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across di⁄erentiated varieties. As standard,
















of the composite good consistent with the ￿nal good producer earning zero pro￿ts.
In turn, each di⁄erentiated good is produced with the technology
Yt(i) = Nt(i)
￿ i 2 [0;1]; ￿ ￿ 1 (7)
8Each domestic household owns an equal share of the monopolistic ￿rms.
10In the absence of any form of nominal price rigidity each monopolistic producer i sets its







where MPNt is the marginal product of labor and ￿t is the (possibly time-varying)





which, once a decision rule is given for the markup, could be interpreted as an aggregate
labor demand function.
The government buys the composite ￿nal good and throws it away, paying for it with
lump-sum taxes Tt. As it is well known, government debt makes no di⁄erence to the
equilibrium variables in this case, hence we will assume that the government budget is
balanced on a period-by-period basis: Tt = Gt, where Gt is real government spending.










where Uj denotes the ￿rst derivative of the period utility function with respect to the
argument j = C;N; Rt is the nominal interest rate, ￿t+1 is the in￿ ation rate between
periods t + 1 and t; and ￿t is the marginal utility of (real) wealth. In equilibrium, ￿t
equals the marginal utility of consumption. As usual, equation (10) can be interpreted as
de￿ning a labor supply relation between the real wage Wt and hours Nt.
Because the Hicksian wealth e⁄ect on labor supply is so central to the operation of
government spending shocks, we use a general utility speci￿cation that allows for di⁄erent
intensities of this e⁄ect. Speci￿cally, we use the period utility function introduced by
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008):
U (Ct;Nt) =
￿





; ￿ > 0 (12)














with f(Nt) = ￿log(1 ￿  N
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The key feature of the KPR utility function is that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and hours is a multiplicative function of Ct, so that hours remain
constant on a balanced-growth path where the real wage and consumption grow at the
same rate. In other words, with this utility function the substitution and income e⁄ects
of a permanent change in the real wage cancel out.9
In the case ￿ = 0 the utility function (13) nests the preferences in GHH, which
display no wealth e⁄ect on labor supply. To see this, notice that when ￿ = 0 (and after
normalizing Xt = 1) the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
is independent of consumption:
 ￿N
￿￿1
t = Wt (15)
Hence, at an unchanged real wage (the relevant case to measure the Hicksian wealth
e⁄ect) hours do not change.
For our purposes, two more points should be noted about the utility function (12).
First, exactly because consumption does not appear in the expression for the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure, GHH preferences fail to be consistent
with the balanced-growth fact emphasized above. Nevertheless, to provide intuition we
will focus on the two polar cases of ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1; we will then look at the intermediate
case of 0 < ￿ < 1, which does satisfy the balanced-growth condition.
9See also Basu and Kimball (2002).
12Second, while the KPR speci￿cation exhibits (log) separability between hours and
consumption when ￿ = 1, the GHH speci￿cation is always non separable: higher values
of ￿ merely imply stronger complementarity between hours and consumption.
5 A two-period version
To gain insight into the working of the model, we ￿rst consider a two-period, perfect
foresight version. We compare a ￿ exible-price equilibrium with a ￿xed-price equilibrium.
When prices are ￿ exible, the markup is constant at "=("￿1); from equation (9) it follows
that, if the production function has constant returns to scale (￿ = 1), also the real wage
is constant. We henceforth focus on this case, which implies that under ￿ exible prices any
substitution e⁄ect from changes in the real wage is eliminated. In turn this allows us to
concentrate speci￿cally on the role of the wealth e⁄ect.
The representative household maximizes the expected discounted sum of utilities:
U (C1;N1) + ￿U (C2;N2) (16)
subject to the budget constraints
C1 + B ￿ W1N1 ￿ T1 + ￿1 (17)
C2 ￿ W2N2 + (1 + r)B ￿ T2 + ￿2 (18)
where B is real bonds, r is the real interest rate, and ￿ is real pro￿ts; note that, by our
assumption of a balanced budget on a period by period basis, each period taxes are equal
to government spending.
In what follows we will refer, somewhat improperly, to the pre-shock ￿ exible price
equilibrium as the "steady-state", so that we will not have to change notation and termi-
nology when we move to the in￿nite horizon model. Let an upper bar indicate a steady
state value, and small letters, like wt; ct; and nt, indicate log deviations from steady state
values. The exception is gt; which is de￿ned as the percentage points deviation of the
share of Gt in steady state output: gt = (Gt ￿ G)=N. Let g indicate the ratio of govern-
ment spending to GDP in the initial steady state: g = G=N. The economy starts in the
13steady state with ￿ exible prices, then at the beginning of period 1 an unexpected shock
g1 > 0 to government spending occurs; if the shock is temporary g2 = 0; if the shock is
permanent, g2 = g1 > 0.
We assume a feedback interest rate rule that relates the short-term nominal interest





where ￿ = (P2￿P1)=P1 and R = 1=￿ is the nominal interest rate in a steady state without
in￿ ation; we assume ￿￿ > 1, which as it is well known is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the price level to be uniquely determined.10 Note that according to this
monetary policy rule the in￿ ation rate must be positive for the real interest rate to rise
above its steady state level 1=￿:
5.1 Flexible prices
We start with the ￿ exible price case. In equilibrium, pro￿ts are just production less labor
income: ￿t = (1 ￿ Wt)Nt; hence WtNt + ￿t = Nt. By combining this condition with
the time t budget constraints of the consumer (equations (17) and (18)) and with the
government budget constraint Tt = Gt; and imposing that in equilibrium net private debt
Bt = 0; we obtain the aggregate resource constraint:
Nt = Ct + Gt (20)
With the real wage ￿xed at W = ("￿1)="; in both periods equilibrium hours are pinned








whereas consumption is determined by (20). Hence the analysis that follows applies to
the e⁄ects of both temporary and permanent shocks.
Log-linearizing the resource constraint (20) yields
nt = ct(1 ￿ g) + gt (22)
10See Woodford (2003).
14Log-linearizing the labor market condition (21) under GHH and using (22) yields
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1 ￿ g
> 0; ct = ￿
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Because the real wage is constant, the key e⁄ect at work here is the wealth e⁄ect of
higher government spending. With ￿ exible prices, the main feature distinguishing the two
utility functions is how the negative wealth e⁄ect of an increase in government spending
is distributed between consumption and hours.
Under KPR, both leisure and consumption are normal goods; since the real wage is
constant, both must fall in each period in which government spending is above its steady
state value.11 If the shock is temporary, the real interest rate, which is determined by the
Euler equation, increases, for the marginal utility of consumption in period 1 increases
(both because consumption falls and because hours increase). As discussed above, this
implies that goods price in￿ ation must be positive.
Under GHH, there is no wealth e⁄ect on hours; hence, consumption absorbs all the
wealth shock, and falls by more than in the KPR case; in fact, from (20) it falls by exactly
the same increase in G. Note that, since the real wage is constant, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and hours ￿ plays no role in determining the equilibrium
value of these variables, both in and out of the steady state.
The result that consumption falls might seem to contrast with Linnemann (2005),
who presents a model with ￿ exible prices where hours and consumption are complements,
and consumption increases after a shock to G. The reason, however, is that he uses a
utility function that cannot be nested into (12), and has the feature that consumption is
an inferior good and the labor supply is downward sloping, as shown by Bilbie (2006).
11If the production function exhibited decreasing returns to scale to labor (￿ < 1), the decline in
consumption would be even stronger, as the real wage would have to decline when hours increase.
15It should be clear by now that, since consumption is a normal good under both KPR
and GHH, it can increase only if the real wage increases, so that by the substitution e⁄ect
hours can increase.12 Of course this is only a necessary condition for consumption to rise:
hours must increase beyond the level needed to pay for the higher government spending.
This is where nominal price rigidities (and therefore variable markup and real wage) enter
the picture.
5.2 Fixed prices
Note ￿rst that, in this perfect foresight model, if goods prices were ￿xed only in period 1,
the ￿ exible price allocation would obtain in both periods. The reason is that in period 2
the allocation would be identical to the ￿ exible price equilibrium; and even though prices
are ￿xed in period 1, prices in period 2 can move in order to obtain the exact real interest
rate that supports the ￿ exible price allocation; the nominal wage in period 2 would then
adjust to obtain a real wage equal to (" ￿ 1)=": In other words, ￿xing goods prices only
in period 1 would be equivalent to ￿xing the composite goods price in period 1 as the
numeraire, but letting all relative prices in both periods and the in￿ ation rate free to
adjust.
Hence, for illustrative purposes we consider an extreme version, with prices ￿xed in
both periods 1 and 2. In turn, given the interest rate rule (19), this implies that the real
interest rate is constant.
Since a permanent shock has the same e⁄ect under ￿ exible and ￿xed prices, we consider
only temporary shocks. From the Euler equation, the marginal utility of consumption in
period 1 must be equal to the (constant) marginal utility of consumption in period 2:
Uc(C1;N1) = Uc(N(1 ￿ g);N) (25)






￿ ￿j ￿ 1; j = GHH; KPR (26)
12Recall that, in equilibrium, there is no wealth e⁄ect on labor supply from a change in the real wage,
since changes in labor income are o⁄set by changes in pro￿ts, given hours.
16where
￿





Note that ￿j can be interpreted as a speci￿c "index of complementarity" between hours
and consumption: it captures the strength of the comovement between C and N, holding
the marginal utility of consumption constant. Expressing the derivative in terms of log










Clearly, the hours multiplier n1=g1 is positive under both speci￿cation of preferences.
Under GHH it is also always greater than 1, hence the consumption multiplier c1=g1 is
positive too. Under KPR, n1=g1 is greater than 1 and c1=g1 is positive only if consumption
and hours are complements, i.e., ￿ > 1:
Importantly, the complementarity index ￿j is inversely related to the wealth e⁄ect on









where ￿ is a negative term by the second order conditions. Thus, if leisure is a normal
good, it must be the case that (WUcc + Ucn) ￿ 0, which implies (from 26) that ￿ ￿ W.
Notice also that the index ￿ is highest under GHH preferences, which feature no
wealth e⁄ect on hours, and then it falls under KPR preferences; in fact, ￿
KPR is negative
if hours and consumption are substitutes (￿ < 1). Appendix C provides an alternative
interpretation of ￿, based on the slopes of the indi⁄erence curves.
Thus, and to summarize, the ￿xed-price model reverses the conclusions of the ￿ exible-
price model: now private consumption can increase in response to a government spending
shock, and the response of consumption is larger, the stronger the negative wealth e⁄ect
on consumption (or, alternatively, the larger the complementarity index ￿j). Below we
provide an intuitive explanation of this result.
Unlike in standard consumption/leisure choice models, where non-labor income is
given, here in equilibrium we have C = N ￿ G regardless of W, since a higher W means
17higher labor income but lower pro￿ts (for simplicity, in the remaining part of this section
we omit the time indices, but it should be understood that all variables refer to period
1). Thus, in equilibrium, from (26) the rate of substitution between N and C is driven







while from the resource constraint the equilibrium rate of transformation between con-












Equating (30) and (31) yields the set of expressions in (28).
Another way to interpret (28) is that, in equilibrium, the di⁄erence between dN and






1￿￿j; once expressed in log deviations from the steady state, these conditions
give exactly the set of expressions (28). Hence, the percentage increase in consumption is
higher the higher the complementarity index.
How is the equilibrium brought about? When G increases, ￿rms reduce the markup
to meet the extra demand at the given prices; as the real wage increases, hours increase.13
Think of a notional "￿rst round" where dN = dG, both under GHH and KPR; because
￿
GHH > ￿
KPR, C increases more under GHH; hence (dN ￿ dC)GHH < (dN ￿ dC)KPR <
dG. Firms reduce the markup further to meet the extra demand, and so on; the process
stops when dN ￿ dC = dG; clearly, in equilibrium, dC is higher the higher ￿. Thus, the
degree of complementarity between consumption and hours captures a multiplier e⁄ect of
the change in G. An additional implication is that the markup will fall more under GHH
relative to KPR preferences in response to a rise in government spending.
The key conclusion from this section is that, with ￿ exible prices, and even if there
is strong complementarity between hours and consumption, the latter cannot increase in
response to a government spending shock, as long as leisure and consumption are normal
13Under KPR, hours increase also because of the downward shift in the labor supply curve due to the
wealth e⁄ect.
18goods; in addition, the response of consumption is more negative, the stronger the negative
wealth e⁄ect of the initial increase in government spending on consumption. But with
￿xed prices the opposite holds true: consumption can increase, and it will increase more,
the stronger the negative wealth e⁄ect of government spending on consumption. In fact,
with ￿xed prices consumption always increases under GHH; and it increases under KPR if
hours and consumption are complements. In any case, the response under KPR is always
smaller than under GHH.
The two period model is obviously extreme in that it ￿xes the real interest rate. If
the real interest rate were allowed to move, then an additional intertemporal substitution
e⁄ect would come to play. But the basic principle remains: by limiting changes in the
real interest rate, price stickiness forces a stronger comovement between consumption and
hours when the utility function is non-separable; because hours increase, the degree of
complementarity determines the response of consumption.
6 In￿nite horizon
Armed with the above intuition, we now go back to the in￿nite horizon version of our
model. Once again we contrast the case of ￿ exible prices to the case of sticky prices.
6.1 Flexible prices
We assume that the evolution of the exogenous variable gt is governed by the AR(1)
process
gt = ￿gt￿1 + ￿t ￿ < 1 (32)
where ￿t is white noise. Thus, the case ￿ = 1 corresponds to a permanent shock. We start
in a steady state, and then assume that at time 0 a positive realization of ￿0 occurs. We
study the impulse responses of selected endogenous variables to this government spending
shock.
It is easy to trace out the dynamics under ￿ exible prices. In this case, the real wage
is constant at (" ￿ 1)=": Hence at any time t the evolution of nt and ct is described by
19(23) under GHH and by (24) under KPR. In turn, the Euler condition (11) pins down the
process for the real interest rate residually.
If the shock is permanent, the system moves immediately to the new steady state,
with no change in hours under GHH preferences, and with some increase under KPR
preferences, but not enough to prevent a decline in consumption. When the shock is
temporary, at time t = 0 consumption falls under both speci￿cations (and by more under
GHH), and then goes back monotonically to the initial steady state, as the wealth e⁄ect
declines and resources are freed up by the decline in G after the initial jump. This is
exactly analogous to the two-period model studied above.
6.2 Sticky prices
We now introduce sticky prices ￿ la Calvo, whereby each period ￿rms face a given proba-
bility of being able to adjust their prices. As it is well known, in equilibrium, this feature
generates a log-linear Phillips curve of the type14
￿t = ￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿mct (33)
where mct is the log deviation of the real marginal cost from its steady state level, and ￿
is a positive function of the probability of adjusting the price (a negative function of the
degree of price stickiness).
Under both types of preferences, we are able to provide a closed-form solution. We
start with the GHH case. Using the log-linearized version of the labor market condition
(15) yields (recall that with constant returns to scale mct = wt):
mct = (￿ ￿ 1)nt (34)
Combining this with the log-linearized resource constraint (22), the Phillips curve becomes
￿t = ￿Et f￿t+1g + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)[(1 ￿ g)ct + gt] (35)
14See Yun (1996), Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003).
20Log linearizing the consumption Euler equation (11), and again using the resource con-
straint (20) to substitute for hours, we obtain:
ct(1 ￿ ￿
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￿









. Hence the rational expectations sticky-price equilibrium under
GHH can be described as a set of processes for fct, ￿t, rtg, for any given exogenous process
fgtg, solving (35), (36) and (the log-linear version of) (19).
We guess the following solution to the above system:
ct = A
GHH
c gt; ￿t = A
GHH
￿ gt (37)
Applying the method of undetermined coe¢ cients one obtains an expression for AGHH
c
which we provide in Appendix D. In the case of purely ￿ exible prices (￿ ! 1); it is easy
to show that AGHH
c coincides with the consumption multiplier in the two-period version
of the model, equation (23). Conversely, in the case of permanently ￿xed prices (￿ ! 0),
AGHH
c reduces to its counterpart in the two-period model, equation (28).
Consider now the KPR case. Using the log linearized version of the labor market
condition (14)
mct = (￿ ￿ 1 +
W
1 ￿ g
)nt + ct (38)
and the log-linearized resource constraint (22), the Phillips curve becomes





+ ￿ ￿ 1
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Log linearizing the consumption Euler equation we obtain an expression which is isomor-
phic to its GHH counterpart (36), except that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is now 1=￿ instead of ￿r=￿ (as we know, under KPR the parameter ￿ indexes both the de-
gree of complementarity between consumption and hours and the elasticity of substitution
in consumption).
Like in the GHH case, applying the method of undetermined coe¢ cients one can
obtain an expression for AKPR;
c which we also provide in Appendix D. Once again, in
21the extreme cases of ￿ exible and ￿xed prices, this expression reduces to its two-period
counterparts, equations (24) and (28), respectively. Exactly like in the two period model,
it is easy to show that AKPR
c < AGHH
c . This implies that, relative to GHH, a larger degree
of price stickiness is necessary under KPR to obtain a positive consumption multiplier.
In addition, AKPR
c is certainly negative if ￿
KPR is negative, i.e., if ￿ < 1. But unlike in
the two period model, AKPR
c can be negative even if ￿ > 1; if there is not enough price
stickiness.
Appendix D shows formally how AKPR
c and AGHH
c depend on the various parameters
of the model. Here we provide the main intuition; we do not display the impulse responses
because all endogenous variables are linear functions of gt, hence they are AR(1) processes
with persistence parametrized by ￿:
The multiplier Aj
c is decreasing in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption, which is captured by ￿r=￿ under GHH and by 1=￿ under KPR. Intuitively, the
larger that elasticity, the stronger the incentive to postpone consumption into the future,
for any given variation in the real interest rate (recall that real interest rate movements
were somehow arti￿cially restricted in the two-period model presented above).
Aj
c is a positive function of the elasticity of the labor supply function, which is inversely
related to ￿: A ￿ atter labor supply function means a bigger increase in hours given the
shift in labor demand, hence a stronger complementarity e⁄ect on consumption.
Aj
c is also positively related to the degree of price stickiness (inversely related to k):
a higher degree of price stickiness implies that more ￿rms will respond to a shock by
increasing production rather than their price; it follows that markups will respond more
strongly, and the derived demand for labor will shift out more.
Finally, Aj
c is decreasing in ￿, the degree of persistence of the government spending
process. Intuitively, the larger ￿, the stronger the impact on lifetime wealth of the required
increase in taxes, and therefore the stronger the negative wealth e⁄ect on consumption.
227 Habit persistence
Our model-based responses of private consumption decline monotonically towards the
steady state after the shock, while the VAR-based impulse responses typically build up
slowly and then go back to trend. We now introduce external habit persistence in con-
sumption. As it is well known from the recent literature15 habit persistence helps dynamic
general equilibrium models capture the gradual buildup of many (real) variables in re-
sponse to alternative shocks. But in addition, we show below that with GHH preferences
habit persistence has surprising e⁄ects in our model.




















e Ct ￿ Ct ￿ hCt￿1 (42)
with h > 0 being the habit persistence parameter.
From the ￿rst order condition the marginal utility of wealth ￿t is no longer equal to
the marginal utility of consumption:
￿t = Ue c;t ￿ h￿Et fUe c;t+1g (43)
where Ue c;t ￿ Ue c(e Ct; Nt). The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and




Ue c;t ￿ h￿Et fUe c;t+1g
= Wt (44)
Therefore, due to external habits the marginal rate of substitution is no longer independent
of consumption. As a consequence, the Hicksian wealth e⁄ect of a change in the real wage
15See, among many others, Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
23on labor supply is now di⁄erent from zero; in other words, habit persistence reintroduces
the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply under GHH preferences. This has a surprising implication
for the equilibrium e⁄ects of government spending on consumption, even under ￿ exible
prices.
We have seen above that, when prices are ￿ exible, under GHH preferences private
consumption falls in response to a rise in government spending, just like under KPR
preferences. This is no longer the case with habit persistence. Intuitively, when govern-
ment spending rises temporarily, the consumer is not willing to decrease consumption
by as much as before, because she knows that consumption will have to go back to the
initial steady-state, and changes in consumption are costly. But then, given that with
￿ exible prices the real wage is constant, labor supply must increase; this in turn can in-
duce an increase in private consumption through the complementarity between hours and
consumption: in fact, we show below that this e⁄ect is stronger the higher ￿.16
Figures 2 and 3 display impulse responses to a government spending shock from the
model with habit persistence, with ￿ exible and sticky prices respectively, assuming a
AR(1) process for government spending (32) with autoregressive parameter ￿ = :8. The
shock to government spending is normalized to 1 percentage point of steady state GDP;
the response of consumption is expressed as share of steady state GDP by multiplying
the log response by the steady state share of consumption in GDP; the responses of hours,
the real wage and the markup are expressed in percentage terms. We assume a value of
the habit parameter, h; equal to :7.17 The other baseline values of the parameters used
for calibration are reported in Table 1:
16Also intuitively, this e⁄ect is stronger the less persistent the shock is: with a very persistent shock
the consumer is willing to adjust consumption downward even with habit persistence, hence we are close
to the case of no habit persistence.
17This is the same as the posterior mode estimate of h for the US in Smets and Wouters (2007).
24Table 1. Calibration in Simulation Exercise
Parameter Description Value
￿ autoregressive parameter of g process 0.8
￿ discount factor 0.99
" price elasticity of demand 6
￿￿ coe¢ cient on in￿ation in monetary policy rule 1.5
￿ slope of NK Phillips curve consistent with 3.5 qrt price stickiness
g steady state share of govt. spending in output 0.2
￿ inverse of elasticity of substitution in consumption 1.5
￿ parameter governing Frisch elasticity of labor supply 1.8
h parameter of habit persistence 0.7
These parameter values are typical of the macro business-cycle literature, hence we
limit a discussion to ￿, the parameter governing the elasticity of labor supply, which
as it is frequently the case in these models bears important consequences. The Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is de￿ned as the elasticity of labor supply to the real wage
holding constant the marginal utility of wealth. In our model with non-separable utility
such elasticity is well de￿ned only in the case of GHH preferences, and equals 1=(￿ ￿ 1).
In the KPR case with ￿ 6= 1 this elasticity is a more complicated function of ￿, and it also
depends on consumption. Existing empirical estimates of the Frisch elasticity in the macro
literature are usually based on KPR-type preferences that are separable in consumption
and leisure. The typical estimates in this literature vary between 1=3 and 1.18 In the by
now classic DSGE studies of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al. (2005) the
implied estimated values of the Frisch elasticities are respectively 0:54 and 1, although
again derived within the context of a model with separable utility. When mapped into
our GHH-based de￿nition of Frisch elasticity such estimates imply a value for ￿ equal to
2:85 and 2; respectively. These values for ￿ are substantially higher than those employed
in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008), who calibrate ￿ = 1:4, and Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe
(2008), who report a posterior mode estimate for ￿ = 1:16. In our exercise we strike a
balance between these estimates and set ￿ = 1:8, implying a value for the GHH-based
18As it is well known, the typical estimate in the micro literature is lower: see e.g. Domeij and Floden
(2006).
25Frisch elasticity of 1:25. We illustrate further insights by means of numerical simulations.
As discussed above, Figure 2 shows that with ￿ exible prices private consumption and
hours now rise in the GHH case. Thus, if one takes an otherwise fully neoclassical model
and only eliminates the wealth e⁄ect on labor supply, habit persistence per se can generate
a positive response of private consumption to a government spending shock, even when
prices are perfectly ￿ exible.
Interestingly, Figure 3 shows that under sticky prices the opposite happens: habit per-
sistence dampens the positive response of private consumption and of the real wage under
GHH preferences. Intuitively, when there are no habits, private consumption increases a
lot on impact, and then goes down monotonically to the steady state: to satisfy the initial
demand producers reduce the markup. But with habits, consumption increases slowly;
hence, producers do not need to reduce the markup by as much as under no habits to
meet the extra demand. The real wage then increases less; this produces a smaller sub-
stitution e⁄ect, hence it dampens the responses of consumption relative to the no habits
case.
The next three ￿gures study the sensitivity of the responses of the main variables to
the key parameters of the model. We know already that the consumption response is
increasing in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (decreasing in ￿; Figure 4) and
increasing in the elasticity of labor supply (decreasing in ￿; Figure 5); the same holds for
the response of hours and the markup.
So far, we have illustrated the polar cases of ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1: As we discussed, the
former case, while displaying no wealth e⁄ect on labor supply, is inconsistent with the
secular growth of the real wage and consumption at almost constant labor supply. In
Figure 6 we display impulse responses of the main variables to a government spending
shock, for alternative values of ￿ under GHH preferences. Speci￿cally, along with the
two polar cases of ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1; we display the cases of ￿ = 0:01; as estimated by
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2008) and implying almost no wealth e⁄ect on labor supply,
and of ￿ = :25; the value used by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008). As one can see, the
response of consumption and hours declines monotonically as ￿ increases. It is essentially
260 for ￿ = :25; and it is negative for ￿ = 1:
8 Capital accumulation
So far we have abstracted from the presence of capital accumulation. In this section we
show that this feature too has important consequences for the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on
consumption and the labor market.
We assume that physical capital is accumulated by the households. The ￿nal invest-
ment good has the same composition as the consumption good. The households￿ s budget
constraint modi￿es to




where Kt is the capital stock at the beginning of time t, and Zt is the real rental rate of
capital.
Capital accumulation evolves according to the law of motion
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + It(1 ￿ ￿t) (46)
where ￿ is the rate of physical depreciation, and ￿t is a function that captures the existence
of adjustment costs on capital.
We will compare two alternative types of adjustment cost on capital, that have ￿gured
prominently in the recent literature. As we will see, the type of adjustment cost has
important consequences, and for intuitive reasons.
In the ￿rst speci￿cation, adjustment costs are proportional to the rate of change in








with the function ￿(￿) satisfying ￿ = ￿
0 = 0 and ￿
00(1) > 0 in steady-state. We label this
case ￿I adjustment costs. In the second speci￿cation, the costs of adjusting capital are









27where ￿(￿) is increasing and convex. We label this case convex adjustment costs.
The key di⁄erence between the two types of frictions is well known: while under con-
vex adjustment costs it is costly to change the stock of capital, under ￿I adjustment
costs it is costly to change the ￿ow of investment. This di⁄erence bears key implications
for the dynamic behavior of investment. Under convex adjustment costs, the dynamic
of investment resembles that under frictionless capital accumulation, with its response
being simply more muted. Conversely, under ￿I adjustment costs, the evolution of in-
vestment resembles the one under planning costs: investment is inertial, namely, it is
largely unresponsive in the short run, and then starts to build up its response gradually
over time.




The optimal choice of labor and capital implies












Notice that the real marginal cost continues to be common across ￿rms as we implicitly
assume a rental market for capital.19 In a symmetric equilibrium, combining (50) and (51)






￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿ (52)
For expositional purposes, it is useful to interpret movements in investment as additional
shifters of the labor demand schedule. To see this, notice that log-linearizing (46), (50),
and (52), and combining, yields (under both types of adjustment costs) the following
19We do not explore here the e⁄ects of the opposite extreme hypothesis, namely capital being ￿rm
speci￿c.




t = ￿(wt ￿ zt) + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 (kt+1 ￿ ￿it) (53)
Hence, on impact, a fall in investment causes, ceteris paribus (and in particular, holding
constant the future capital stock), a leftward shift in the labor demand schedule. As
capital builds up over time, though, this e⁄ect will be reversed.
The implications of capital accumulation for the transmission of government spending
shocks in models with KPR preferences are well known. Consider ￿rst the case of ￿ exible
prices, as in Baxter and King (1993). The expansion in labor supply implied by the
negative wealth e⁄ect induces a rise in the marginal product of capital. In equilibrium,
this induces a rise in the rental cost of capital, and therefore a fall in investment. The
strength of this negative e⁄ect on investment depends on the persistence of the shock.
If the government spending shock is very short-lived, wealth is barely a⁄ected: hence
consumption and leisure, and therefore hours, barely respond. Given that capital is
predetermined, output is also barely a⁄ected on impact, hence even if the e⁄ect on the
rental cost is muted (due to the muted e⁄ect on hours) a temporary rise in government
spending crowds out private investment almost one-to-one on impact. In general, the
higher the persistence of the shock, the larger the negative wealth e⁄ect on consumption,
and hence the smaller the crowding-out e⁄ect on investment.
As shown in Linnemann and Schabert (2003) the crowding-out e⁄ect on investment
survives with nominal price stickiness, in fact it is even stronger. The reason is that the
outward shift in labor demand (due to the fall in the markup) causes a stronger response
of hours, and therefore a stronger increase in the rental cost of capital.
With KPR preferences (not shown) frictions in capital accumulation do not a⁄ect the
response of consumption signi￿cantly. But things are di⁄erent under GHH preferences.
Figure 7 displays impulse responses for the two types of adjustment costs, with habit
persistence and in the case of sticky prices. In the case of ￿I adjustment costs we specify





















In this exercise we set ￿ = 2 in the case of convex costs and ￿ = 3 in the case of ￿I
adjustment costs (as estimated in Christiano et al. 2005 and more recently by Schmitt-
GrohØ and Uribe 2008). Like in the previous section we assume a value of the habit
persistence parameter, h; of 0:7. The share of labor in output, ￿, is set to .66. The other
parameters are as in Table 1.
Investment falls below baseline in response to the shock, as in the standard model with
KPR. But consumption increases (by about .3 percentage points of GDP at peak) only
under ￿I adjustment costs, which generates a weaker decline in investment. The intuition
is as follows. As illustrated above, a decline in investment generates a leftward movement
in the labor demand schedule. In the case of ￿ exible prices, and under GHH preferences,
this invariably generates a fall in the real wage and therefore a negative substitution e⁄ect
on consumption. In the case of sticky prices, the leftward movement in the labor demand
schedule competes with the rightward movement due to the fall in the markup. Under ￿I
adjustment costs the initial decline in investment is smaller, hence the rightward shift in
labor demand prevails, leading to higher real wage and private consumption; the opposite
occurs under convex costs of adjustment.
Basu and Kimball (2003) show that in a standard model with KPR preferences the
type of friction in capital accumulation has implications for the output response to gov-
ernment spending shocks.20 It is interesting to notice that in the same model, with
GHH preferences, capital accumulation frictions have powerful implications not only for
20In fact, ￿I adjustments costs, by generating investment inertia, limit the crowding-out e⁄ect on
investment of a government spending shock, allowing employment and output to expand relatively more
than under convex costs of adjustment.
30the output multiplier but also for both the sign and the magnitude of the consumption
multiplier.
9 Matching the SVAR impulse responses
In this section we evaluate the ability of the more quantitative version of our model, fea-
turing adjustment costs on capital of the ￿I type and habit persistence in consumption,
to ￿t the estimated impulse responses in our VAR exercise. We proceed as follows. Start-
ing from the initial deterministic steady state, we feed through the model the estimated
impulse response process for government spending obtained from the SVAR estimate.
The parameter values are the same we assumed for the simulation exercise in the previous
section: We set the parameter governing the wealth e⁄ect in the GHH preferences, ￿; to
.01, the value estimated by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2008).
Figures 8 and 9 display the results of our simulation exercise over an horizon of ten
quarters. Each panel features the response of a selected variable obtained from the model
(solid line) compared to the point estimates from the SVAR exercise based on the non-
farm business sector data (dashed line). Each panel also reports one standard error bands
from the SVAR exercise.
For illustrative purposes, we start in Figure 8 with the model without capital. This
model clearly matches well the response of consumption, the real consumption wage and
the markup. In particular, it matches well the gradual and persistent build-up of con-
sumption following the shock.
Figure 9 displays the responses from the model with capital. As argued above, the
SVAR impulse response features a very prolonged response of consumption (which reaches
the peak at about ￿fteen quarters), whereas in the model consumption starts to revert
back to baseline after about seven quarters. A similar problem applies to the comparison
between estimated and simulated paths for the real consumption wage and the markup.
The latter in particular responds too strongly on impact relative to the data, although it
falls within the estimated bands between three and ten quarters. This general problem
31has to do with the role of investment in the model. In a nutshell, whereas in the data
the response of investment is relatively quick and short-lived, in the model it is inertial
in the short-run and subsequently very persistent. After a few quarters, the prolonged
fall in investment (which re￿ ects the very persistent nature of the estimated process
for government spending) tends to dampen the positive labor demand e⁄ect induced by
counter-cyclical markups, therefore also dampening the response of the real wage and
consumption.
10 Conclusions: alternative explanations
Rather than going once more through the main features and results of our model, we now
discuss two alternative models that deliver a positive response of private consumption
to a government spending shock. They di⁄er from ours either in the way they generate
a positive eal wage response, or in the way they translate a higher real wage in higher
private consumption. Both of them use standard KPR-type preferences.21
Like us, Gal￿, Lopez-Salido and VallØs (2007) assume nominal rigidities to generate
a rise in the real wage, but they rely on an extreme form of market incompleteness to
generate the increase in private consumption. A fraction of the population cannot borrow
nor lend and must consume all their labor income each period. Thus, when the real
consumption wage increases, their labor income also increases, and so does their private
consumption; if the share of hand-to-mouth consumers is large enough, aggregate private
consumption can increase.
Like us, Ravn, Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2006) assume complete asset markets, but
they di⁄er from us in the mechanism they use to generate a countercyclical markup. They
assume the existence of customer markets with good-speci￿c habit persistence, part of a
wide class of models with the common feature that the elasticity of demand perceived
by the producers falls when aggregate demand increases.22 In their model, the demand
21Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2008) experiment with GHH preferences but do not investigate the e⁄ects
of government spending shocks on private consumption and the real wage.
22An earlier example of this class is Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), that relies instead on strategic
32function facing each producer has a price-elastic component that is a function of aggregate
demand, and a price-inelastic component that is a function of the good-speci￿c habit. An
increase in aggregate demand, caused for instance by a shock to government spending,
increases the share of the price-elastic component and thus the elasticity of demand, which
in turn makes the markup countercyclical.
However, for plausible parameter values, this model generates a very small positive
response of private consumption: in the benchmark solutions, when government spending
increases by 1 percentage point of GDP, the peak response of private consumption is
about .1 percentage point of GDP, and still requires a decline in the markup of about
5 percentage points. Thus, the private consumption and the markup responses appear
counterfactually small and large, respectively. The private consumption response in Gal￿,
Lopez-Salido and VallØs (2007) is larger, but only if the share of hand-to-mouth consumers
is large enough (in their benchmark solutions, 50 percent of the total population).
The underlying reason of these features is the same in both models: the positive
wealth e⁄ect on labor supply and the negative wealth e⁄ect on private consumption of
a government spending shock. In Ravn, Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2006), this negative
wealth e⁄ect operates on all individuals; in order to overcome it, the real wage must
increase a lot, to induce enough substitution from leisure into consumption.This requires
a very countercyclical markup. In the end, and despite an implausibly large response of
the markup, private consumption still increases imperceptibly. In Gal￿, Lopez-Salido and
VallØs (2007), the negative wealth e⁄ect operates fully on the fraction of individuals who
are not credit constrained: to overcome this, one needs enough hand-to-mouth consumers,
whose private consumption depends only on the real after-tax wage.
By emphasizing a di⁄erent mechanism, we do not mean to imply that the mechanisms
described in these two papers are implausible or empirically irrelevant. The goal of this
paper is to better understand the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks
in a neoclassical model with price rigidity, and to highlight the role of the wealth e⁄ect
on labor supply. A low wealth e⁄ect has been used recently to show that anticipated
interactions between producers.
33productivity shocks can have positive e⁄ects on current economic activity (see Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2008) and Schmitt-GrohØ and Ur￿be (2008)). We show that it also has rather
surprising implications for the e⁄ects of government spending in an otherwise standard
real model of the business cycle.
34Appendix A: The data
Government spending: constructed as log[(A955RA3*GC1_2000+B873RA3*GC2_2000)/pop],
where:
A955RA3: Government consumption expenditure, quantity index of chained 2000
dollars
B873RA3: Federal gross investment in equipment and software, national defense,
quantity index of chained 2000 dollars
GC1_2000: value in 2000 of A955RC1 (Government consumption expenditure, nom-
inal)
GC2_2000: value in 2000 of B873RC1 (Federal gross investment in equipment and
software, national defense, nominal)
GDP: constricted as log(B191RA3/pop), where
B191RA3: Gross domestic product, index of chained 2000 dollars
Private consumption: log(a794rx0)
a794rx0: personal consumption expenditure, chained 2000 dollars per capita
Private investment: log(B007RA3/pop)
B007RA3: Gross private ￿xed domestic investment, quantity index of chained 2000
dollars
Tax rate: Barro-Sahasakul Average marginal labor income tax rate, from Barro-Sahasakul
(1983), (1986), updated by Stephenson (1998) up to 1996 and by Perotti (2007)
thereafter
Markup, Non-￿nancial corporate business: constructed as log[(A455RC1-A325RC1)/A460RC1],
where
A455RC1: Gross value added of non-￿nancial corporate business, BEA Table 1.14
A325RC1: Taxes on production and imports less subsidies paid by non-￿nancial
corporate business, BEA Table 1.14
35A460RC1: Compensation of employees in non-￿nancial corporate business, BEA
Table 1.14
Markup, Manufacturing: constructed as log(J426RC1/A552RC1), where
J426RC1: National income without capital consumption adjustment, Manufactur-
ing, BEA Table 6.1B
A552RC1: Wage and salary disbursements, Manufactruing, BEA Table 2.2A
Wage, Business sector: PRS84006103: Hourly compensation, Business sector, BLS
Wage, Manufacturing: CES3000000006: Average hourly earnings of production work-
ers in manufacturing, BLS
De￿ ator, Business sector: PRS84006143: Implicit price de￿ ator, Business sector, BLS
De￿ ator, Manufacturing: WPUDUR0200: Producer price index, manufacturing goods,
BLS
CPI de￿ ator: CPIULFSL: CPI for all urban consumers: All items less food, BLS
Appendix B: Markups and the labor share










where e Q is valued added, M is intermediate inputs, and s is the share of intermediate
inputs in gross output (in what follows, a tildaewill indicate a value added variable).
The value added production function is Cobb-Douglas in labor and capital:
e Q = N
￿K
1￿￿ (57)
The value added price markup is
e ￿ =
e P e QN
W
(58)
36which, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, reduces to:
e ￿ = ￿e s
￿1
N (59)
Thus, there is a linear relation between the logs of the value added markup and of the
labor share in value added. We now show that this is no longer the case for the gross
output markup and labor share.
The nominal marginal cost of producing an extra unit of gross output is




where PM is the price of intermediates and W=e QN is the nominal marginal cost of pro-
ducing an extra unit of value added. The inverse of the gross output markup is thus
1
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23With imperfect competition and substitutability between intermediates and primary inputs, the
correct value added de￿ ator is
PQ ￿ ￿PMM
e Q
since ￿rms also mark up intermediate costs (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, p. 1090). The formulla
used in the text is the Divisia value added de￿ ator as calculated for instance by BEA, and would be
correct under perfect competition.
37which shows that the relationship between the labor share in gross output sN and the
gross output markup ￿ is not linear, and it is in￿ uenced by movements in s and
PM:
P : In
particular, by replacing (66) into (67), it is easy to see that, if PM=P falls after a ￿scal
policy shocks that raises demand, the gross output markup could increase while the value
added markup falls.
Appendix C: An interpretation of the index of com-
plementarity between consumption and hours
Suppose we represent the indi⁄erence curve and the budget constraint in the C; N space,
with C on the vertical axis. Importantly, ￿ is directly related to the wealth e⁄ect on hours.
Under GHH preferences, there is no wealth e⁄ect on hours: graphically, this means that















GHH = W (69)
If instead there is a positive wealth e⁄ect of W on hours (i.e., leisure is a normal good)








so that the tangency point of the new equilibrium indi⁄erence curve with a budget con-








KPR < W (71)
Appendix D. Sticky price model: closed form solution
We illustrate in this section the closed-form solution of the in￿nite horizon model with
staggered prices.
38GHH preferences Log linearizing the consumption Euler under GHH yields ini-
tially
ct ￿  
N￿
C
￿nt = Et fct+1g ￿  
N￿
C
￿Et fnt+1g ￿ ￿
￿1
￿




(rt ￿ Et f￿t+1g)




where ￿ = W
￿1
is the steady state markup. Let￿ s de￿ne






where g is the share of government spending in output. Notice that ￿r < 1. We also
assume ￿r > 0, so that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is
positive. Hence we can re-write:
ct ￿ (1 ￿ ￿r)￿nt = Et fct+1g ￿ (1 ￿ ￿r)￿Et fnt+1g ￿
￿r
￿
(rt ￿ Et f￿t+1g)
Notice that since ￿r < 1 the GHH preferences are always non separable.
Log linearizing the consumption-leisure condition, and using the log-linearized aggre-
gate resource constraint:
mct = (￿ ￿ 1)nt
= (￿ ￿ 1)[(1 ￿ g)ct + gt]
Using the aggregate resource constraint to eliminate employment, we can express the
equilibrium in terms of the system















Et fgt+1 ￿ gtg ￿
￿r
￿
(rt ￿ Et f￿t+1g)
We can guess the pair of solutions:
ct = A
GHH
c gt; ￿t = A
GHH
￿ gt





GHH (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿￿r
￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ g)
(1 ￿ ￿
GHH)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) + ￿￿r











which coincides with (23)) in the two-period version of the model. Conversely, in the case











which once again coincides with its counterpart in the two-period model (see equation
(28)).
KPR case Log-linearizing the consumption-leisure condition yields:
mct =
￿




nt + ct (75)
Log-linearizing the consumption Euler equation yields
ct￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿r)￿
￿
￿
nt = Et fct+1g￿
￿






















Et(gt+1 ￿ gt) ￿
1
￿
(rt ￿ Et f￿t+1g) (76)
40which is isomorphic to the Euler equation in the GHH case, except that the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is now 1=￿ instead of ￿r=￿.





KPR (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)￿
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W + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ g)




which again is the same formula as in the two-period model, equation (24). Similarly,











exactly as in the two-period ￿xed-price model, equation (28).
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Figure 1: SVAR and RS responses
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Figure 2: No capital, ￿ exible prices
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Figure 3: No capital, sticky prices
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Figure 4: No capital, sticky prices, habit persistence: sensitivity to ￿
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Figure 5: No capital, sticky prices, habit persistence: sensitivity to ￿
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Figure 6: No capital, sticky prices, habit persistence: sensitivity to ￿
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Figure 8: No capital, sticky prices, habit persistence: matching SVAR and model-based
impulse responses
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Figure 9: Capital, sticky prices, habit persistence: matching SVAR and model-based
impulse responses
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